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Past evidence on the incidence of payroll tax subsidies on employment
and wages for disadvantaged workers has been quite mixed. Therefore, this
paper makes use of a unique panel of firm level data and a natural experiment
to analyze the incidence of wage subsidies on full-time manual workers and
pre-tax wages. Using a number of straightforward evaluation estimators we
find that employment subsidies increased full-time manual employment and
pre-tax wages. Moreover, we find that employment subsidies have increased
employment but not wages by more in low-wage exporting industries. This is
line with a textbook description of labor markets where it is predicted that the
incidence of employment subsidies on employment and wages is larger the
more elastic is product and therefore labor demand and where the employment
effect is larger and the wage effect is smaller the more elastic is labor supply
because of a binding minimum wage.
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I. Introduction
Economists writing about the impact of globalization or recent
technological change have highlighted the decreasing demand for less-skilled
employment in developed economies (Freeman [2006], Autor, Levy and
Murnane [2003], Goos and Manning [2007]). An interesting question thus is
how developed economies can redistribute the gains from globalisation or
technological change to assure that also disadvantaged workers fare well in face
of current changes in relative factor demand.
Market incentives for increased educational investment and skill
upgrading can play some role in alleviating the growing inequality and labor
market prospects of the less-skilled. But the process of supply adjustment can
take many years, and many disadvantaged individuals face financial and
informational barriers to pursuing further education and training. Therefore,
wage subsidies to private employers have often been proposed by economists
as a relatively flexible and efficient method to improve the relative earnings and
employment of the less-skilled (for example, see Phelps [1994]).
However, not much research attention has focused on evaluating micro
demand-side policies to offset the decline in demand for less-skilled workers.
This paper therefore makes use of a natural experiment to analyze the effects
of payroll tax exemptions targeted at manual workers in the late 1990s in
Belgium,   g e n e r a l l y   k n o w n   a s   t h e   “ Ma r i b e l subsidies” . Given a unique panel of
firm level data with information about whether or not a firm received subsidy3
and, if so, the amount of subsidy received in any given year, we are able to
examine the impact of employment subsidies on employment and wages in
various ways. We find that employment subsidies have had a positive impact
on manual employment and a positive but smaller impact on pre-tax wages.
Moreover, we find that employment subsidies have increased employment but
not wages by more in low-wage exporting industries. This is line with a
textbook description of labor markets where it is predicted that the incidence
of employment subsidies on employment and wages is larger the more elastic is
product and therefore labor demand and where the employment effect is larger
and the wage effect is smaller the more elastic is labor supply because of a
binding minimum wage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes the theoretical motivation and briefly surveys the existing related
literature. Section III describes the firm level data together with the
employment subsidy system. Section IV presents the micro-econometric
evidence and Section V concludes.
II. Theoretical Motivation and Related Literature
II. A. Theoretical motivation
Employment subsidies are defined as a per-period lump-sum reduction
in employer social security contributions for each manual worker employed at4
the firm. Given payroll taxes are proportional, the pre-tax ( pre tax w  ) and post-
tax ( post tax w  ) wages are therefore given by:
(1) (1 ) post tax pre tax w w t      
with t the marginal payroll tax and the employment subsidy paid to the
firm. In this setting the marginal tax rate is not affected by the introduction of
the subsidy, but the average tax rate becomes decreasing in the pre-tax wage.
Figure 1 provides the simplest possible framework to analyze the
impact of the employment subsidy. An increase in employment subsidies shifts
the unconditional labor demand curve out thereby increasing employment and
the pre-tax wage. It is also straightforward to see that the increase in
employment is larger the more elastic are labor supply and demand. Similarly,
the increase in the pre-tax wage is larger the more elastic is labor demand and
the more inelastic is labor supply. Besides an increase in labor demand, also
labor supply can shift following an increase in employment subsidies. For
example, if reservation wages are indexed to prices rather than wages, labor
supply increases following an increase in employment subsidies.
1
Consequently, the increase in the pre-tax wage will therefore be smaller and
the increase in employment larger.
It follows immediately from equation (1) that, when labor markets are
competitive, the structure of taxation does not matter. That is, what matters
1 That is, employment subsidies will shift the labor demand curve out, thereby increasing real
market wages. So, if real reservation wages are constant, the increase in the real market wage
induces an unambiguous positive substitution effect to labor supply.5
for the labor demand response is by how much the employment subsidy
decreases total costs independent of how exactly subsidies are being paid to
employers. More generally, the nature of taxation should not matter in any
model where each individual firm takes the equilibrium wage as given, such as
a wide range of incentive wage models (e.g. the assumption that higher wages
bring about more effort from employees, the assumption that higher wages
attract better quality workers or the assumption that higher wages prevent
workers from shirking (Pissarides [1998])).
However, the structure of the tax system does matter when each firm
no longer is a wage taker. For example, when workers are organized in trade
unions and wages are determined after a bargain between the firm and the
union. To see this, consider Figure 1 again. Now an increase in employment
subsidies will shift the labor demand curve out, just as before. But also the
wage bargaining curve will directly shift out as a response to an increase in
subsidies. The intuition is that more employment subsidies make the payroll
tax system more progressive which implies unions perceive the labor demand
curve to become more elastic thereby moderating their wage demands.
2
In sum, employment subsidies are expected to increase manual
employment in subsidized firms. This employment effect will be larger the
more elastic are labor demand and supply. Pre-tax wages for subsidized
2 Moreover, under particular assumptions about bargaining and production technologies, it is
easy to show that the shift in the wage bargaining curve following an increase in Maribel
subsidies results in a decrease rather than increase in pre-tax wages. For example, Lockwood
and Manning [1993] show this is the case for right-to-manage bargaining assuming isoelastic
labor demand.6
workers are also expected to increase the more elastic is labor demand and the
more inelastic is labor supply but the wage incidence of employment subsidies
could be mitigated if also labor suppl y   i n c r e a s e s   b e c a u s e   w o r k e r ’ s   o u t s i d e  
options become relatively less interesting or because unions moderate their
wage demands.
II. B. Related macroeconomic literature
Pissarides [1998] simulates the general equilibrium incidence of
taxation using the different models discussed above. Assuming that the
marginal payroll tax is 40 percent of the pre-tax wage, he finds that a lump-sum
subsidy set at 20 percent of the pre-tax wage decreases unemployment with 4
percentage points and increases the pre-tax wage with 13 percent if
unemployment benefits are indexed to prices and not wages and labour
markets are assumed competitive. In case unemployment benefits are indexed
to wages and not prices, the impact on pre-tax wages is similar but
unemployment decreases by less than a percentage point. Similar effects are
found assuming incentive wages though the decrease in unemployment is
g e n e r a l l y   l a r g e r   b e c a u s e   t h e   “ n o n -s h i r k i n g   c o n d i t i o n ”   i s   modelled to be more
elastic than the labour supply curve. In the presence of unions, an employment
subsidy set at 20 percent of the pre-tax wage decreases the unemployment rate
with 6 percentage points and increases the pre-tax wage with 12 percent if
unemployment benefits are indexed to prices and not wages. If unemployment7
benefits are indexed to wages and not prices, the effect on the pre-tax wage is
similar but unemployment only decreases with 1 percentage point.
Turning to the empirical evidence, Figure 2 uses OECD data to show
the relationship between employment and payroll taxes in various developed
economies. Countries, such as Belgium, France and Germany with a payroll tax
burden of more than 40 percent of pre-tax wages are characterized by lower
employment rates. However, Nickell [2003] surveys eleven studies using cross-
sections or panel data for a number of OECD countries to examine the
employment impact of taxes. In these studies, the estimated long-run impact
on labor market participation of a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge
varies from -7.5 percentage points to 5.5 percentage points with a midpoint of
-0.5. He also provides a similar discussion for estimates of the impact of taxes
on wages and also here the evidence is quite mixed. In conclusion, Nickell
(2003) ascribes the wide fluctuations in estimates of the incidence of taxation
to variations in other variables included in the labor demand equation that are
also correlated with tax differences.
II. C. Related microeconomic literature
An alternative approach is to move beyond time-series and cross-
country variation to find payroll tax changes which had differential effects
within a country over time. For example, Katz [1996] reviews the evidence on
the effectiveness of wage subsidy programs in the US and provides some
evidence on the employment effects of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit that8
operated in the US from 1979 to 1994. He finds that subsidies related to net
changes in employment (sometimes conditional on training and retaining
requirements) have increased employment and wages for the group of targeted
workers. However, Katz [1996] also argues that despite the substantial
experience of advanced nations with payroll tax subsidies, the lack of formal
evaluation evidence leaves much uncertainty concerning the likely impacts of
such policies.
In answer to this, Gruber [1997] uses firm level panel data to analyze
the privatisation of social security in Chile during the early 1980s when the
average payroll tax fell from 30 percent to 5 percent over a six year period. He
finds that the incidence of payroll tax reductions was fully on wages, with no
effect on employment. To explain this finding, Gruber conjectures that either
labor supply is very inelastic or that -labor supply might have shifted inwards if
the reduction in payroll taxation was paid for by a decrease in other benefits
related to work such as retirement benefits or compensation for workplace
injuries.
This study differs from Gruber [1997] in two important ways. First,
Gruber does not observe whether or not a firm actually received a subsidy and,
if so, the amount of subsidy received. This implies that the reduction in payroll
taxes that is only due to a change in the tax system has to be imputed at the
firm level in some way. This paper does not have this problem since we
directly observe subsidies received by each participating firm. Second, the
policy change examined in Gruber [1997] applied to all workers in all firms in9
all sectors. In contrast, this paper estimates the incidence of employment
subsidies exploiting a number of sources of variation in program intensity
using various straightforward estimators.
III. Institutional Background and Data
III.1. Institutional Background
The history of “ Maribel”   e m p l o y m e n t   s u b s i d i e s   t h a t   w e r e   i m p l e m e n t e d  
in Belgium is summarized in Table 1. Maribel I stated that employers were
entitled to a reduction of 6.17 percentage points in employer contributions for
each full-time manual worker employed in the private sector, except for
companies in electricity, gas and water as well as financial intermediation. In
1983, Maribel I was transformed from a proportional into a lump-sum subsidy
and higher subsidies were given to smaller firms. In 1993, Maribel I was
replaced by Maribel II/III though this change only affected a number of
industries. In particular, higher subsidies were granted to “ t a r g e t   i n d u s t r i e s ” ,  
i.e. exporting as well as transport industries. Mid 1997, Maribel II/III was
substituted for Maribel IV. Maribel IV no longer explicitly targeted specific
industries but made the subsidy to increase with the fraction of manual
workers employed at the firm. Finally, Maribel subsidies came to an end in the
second quarter of 1999. From 1999 until 2004, employer tax exemptions have
been gradually converging towards a harmonised system of proportional and
lump-sum reductions for manual as well as non-manual labor.10
Due to data constraints explained below, it is the variation imposed by
Maribel II/III and Maribel IV that will be used in this paper. Table 2 therefore
shows the annual lump-sum subsidies per full-time manual worker for Maribel
II/III. The table shows that for the first 5 manual workers in small companies
(i.e. less than 20 employees), the subsidy was 37 200 BEF for target industries
and 12 000 BEF for non-target industries (except firms in excluded
industries)
3. For all other manual workers in target and non-target industries,
the subsidy amounted to 33 748 BEF and 7 500 BEF respectively.
The first column of Table 3 shows how Maribel IV was different from
Maribel II/III. Rather than explicitly targeting certain industries, Maribel IV
granted lump-sum reductions in payroll taxes that are increasing in the intensity
of manual labor at the firm. It also clear from Table 3 that the subsidy was
highest for firms employing less than 5 employees and smallest for firms
employing more than 10 employees and that, for a given fraction of manual
work, firms employing between 5 and 10 employees received some convex
combination of both.
In sum, Tables 2 and 3 show that one can expect substantial variation
in whether or not a firm received Maribel subsidies both within and between
time periods. It is also clear that among the group of subsidised firms at each
point in time, the average per-worker subsidy is decreasing in firm size. It is
this variation that will be exploited in the analysis below.
3 BEF stands for Belgian Francs, one Euro = 40.33 BEF.11
III.B. Firm level data
The data used in this paper are derived from the balance sheets of
Belgian companies contained in BELFIRST. Most importantly, since 1996
BELFIRST includes the social balance sheet of companies providing panel
data information about employment, wages and the amount of employment
subsidy received by each firm every year. Because this information is only
available from 1996 onwards, we only retrieved data from 1996 up to 1999.
To check the randomness of our BELFIRST sample, Table 4 compares
administrative data from all social security tax records in 1995 with BELFIRST
data in 1996. The rows in Table 4 give the fraction of Maribel workers (i.e.
full-time manual workers) and the fraction of Maribel subsidies by industry for
both data sources. This comparison suggests that the BELFIRST data are
representative except for the single industry of health and social work.
Moreover, Table 4 shows that Maribel II/III workers are largely employed in
manufacturing industries and that exporting industries in manufacturing
receive higher subsidies on average. This is also true to some extend for
c o m p a n i e s   i n   “ t r a n s p o r t s   a n d   c o m m u n i c a t i o n ”   g i v e n   t h a t   t h e   t r a n s p o r t   s e c t o r  
also is a targeted industry under Maribel II/III. Table 4 shows that Maribel
workers are also concentrated in construction and wholesale and retail
industries but that those industries received lower average subsidies compared
to targeted companies. Finally the bottom row of Table 4 suggests that about
50 percent of all subsidized firms are included in our data set.12
Table 5 provides some information about the number of subsidized
and non-subsidized firms. For each year, Table 5 shows the total number of
firms, mean full-time employment and mean full-time manual employment for
receivers and non-receivers (i.e. firms with strictly positive full-time manual
employment but not receiving a subsidy) in our sample respectively. For the
group of subsidized firms, the number of observations increased from 20 635
in 1996 to 32 517 in 1998, which is explained by the extension of Maribel
subsidies to firms in non-target industries. The drop in the number of
observations between 1998 and 1999 can be explained by the fact that Maribel
subsidies ended in June 1999. Importantly, Table 5 also shows that mean full-
time employment in subsidized firms was much larger compared to the group
of firms that employed manual workers but received no subsidy in the sample.
This could be due to the fact that subsidized firms are concentrated in
industries with higher average firm size or that it was too expensive for small
firms to know about or administer the subsidy.
4 In any case, it will be
important to account for these differences in the analysis below.
Finally, Table 6 only considers the group of subsidized firms in
BELFIRST and the first column compares the average subsidy received per
full-time manual worker for the different years (in brackets are standard errors
reflecting the variation of average per-worker subsidies across firms). It shows
that the average subsidy increased between 1996 and 1998 or 1999 if Maribel
4 Katz [1996] also finds that, if participation is voluntary, take-up rates in the New Jobs Tax
Credit (NJTC) and Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) programs are decreasing in firm level
employment. For example, Perloff and Wachter [1979] find that only 34 percent of firms in
their survey knew of the existence of NJTC although almost all large firms did.13
had continued to exist until the end of that year. The final column informs
about the fraction of the total subsidy as a percentage of total labor costs,
reflecting that on average Maribel subsidies increased from 1.61 percent of the
wage bill in 1996 to 2.64 percent in 1998.
IV. Results
IV.A. Main results
One way of assessing the incidence of Maribel subsidies is to compare
employment growth between firms that started or stopped receiving Maribel
subsidies and firms that did not change their participation status in the Maribel
program. Pooling all years and all firms, this suggests the following estimating
equation:
(2) 0 1 2 log( ) ' it it t i it y maribel YEAR          
with it y full-time manual employment for firm i at time t, it maribel a dummy
equal to 1 if firm i received a subsidy at time t, t YEAR a vector of year
dummies, i a firm fixed effect and it a white-noise error term. An OLS point
estimate for 1  is given in the first column of Table 7 suggesting that firms
start (stop) receiving Maribel subsidies increased (decreased) full-time manual
employment by 5.7 percent due to the subsidy (standard errors are in brackets).
Because the level of and entitlement to the Maribel subsidy changed over time,14
column (2) of Table 7 provides an estimate for each year the subsidy was in
place using the following estimating equation:
(3) 0 1 2 log( ) * ' it t it t t i it t y maribel year YEAR           
Point estimates for 1t  are given in column (2) and reflect that the
employment impact was larger in 1997 compared to 1998 which is due to the
fact that Maribel IV became relatively more generous for less competitive non-
exporting industries and the fact that minimum wages are more likely to bind
in low-paid exporting industries that were targeted by the Maribel II/III
regime (note for example that in Table 5 the annual average pre-tax wage paid
by subsidized firms in 1997 is smaller than in 1998). Also the lower point
estimate for 1999 can be expected since the average annual Maribel IV subsidy
was lower due to an end to the program in that year.
Columns (3) to (6) of Table 7 repeat the analysis done in columns (1)
and (2) after splitting up the experimental group into firms that start
participating and firms that stop participating in the program. Point estimates
for both experimental groups are statistically significant and the employment
impact of Maribel subsidies seems to be independent of the direction of
change in program status. This is important since it suggests that firms
participating in the Maribel program are not characterized by higher
employment trend growth that would bias upwards the point estimates in15
columns (1) to (4) and bias downwards the point estimates in columns (5) and
(6).
5
Table 8 repeats the analysis done in Table 7 using the logarithm of the
mean pre-tax wage paid at the firm as the dependent variable. Though, due to
data limitations, the pre-tax wage is calculated as the mean wage for all full-
time workers in the firm (not just full-time manual workers), three conclusions
can be drawn from Table 8. First, the wage incidence of Maribel subsidies is
smaller at around 2 percent but point estimates are statistically significant.
Second, point estimates are larger for 1998 compared to 1997. This is
consistent with the smaller employment effects for 1998 compared to 1997
found in Table 7 and suggests that labor supply for non-target industries is less
elastic. Some evidence in support of this hypothesis is given by that point
estimates in Table 8 for firms that stop receiving subsidies are smaller
compared to firms that start receiving subsidies, especially in 1997.
Though one could conclude from the evidence presented in Tables 7
and 8 that Maribel subsidies have increased full-time manual employment and
wages, an important question is to what extend these gains have come at the
“ d i s p l a c e m e n t ”   o f other types of labor. Table 9 therefore experiments with
alternative employment measures that were not directly affected by the
subsidy. Columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) use the number of full-time managers and
other white-collar full-time employment as the dependent variables
5 Also note that the analysis already partially controls for the presence of different trend
growth between firms receiving and firms not receiving Maribel subsidies since the control
group also contains firms that receive subsidies in any two consecutive periods.16
respectively. Though point estimates are positive, they are not always
statistically significant (also due to relatively small sample sizes) and in any case
smaller to those reported in the first column of Table 7. The explanation for
the absence of any displacement effect can be twofold. First, point estimates in
Table 9 can capture that Maribel receivers would have increased overall
employment even in the absence of the subsidy. If this would be the case, the
point estimates of Table 9 would have to be subtracted from the point
estimates in Table 7 to find the true employment impact of Maribel subsidies
for full-time manual workers. A second possible explanation for the absence of
any displacement effect is that different types of labor are complements rather
than substitutes in production and that Maribel subsidies also increased the
employment measures reported in Table 9. There are two reasons why one
would favor this second hypothesis. First, since it was argued above that it is
unlikely that point estimates in Table 7 are biased due to a differential trend in
employment growth between participating and non-participating firms, the
point estimates in Table 9 would have to capture idiosyncratic factor demand
shocks (rather than secular differences in employment trend growth) at the
firm level that are correlated with program participation. Second, in line with
this reasoning are the somewhat higher point estimates in Table 9 for
temporary employment (though they are only marginally statistically
significant) since adjustment costs for temporary employment are significantly
less compared to permanent workers in Belgium.17
In sum, simple difference-in-differences estimates suggest that
employment subsidies have increased full-time manual employment with 5 to 8
percent and pre-tax wages with 1 to 3 percent depending on the amount of
per-worker subsidy received and the distribution of employment subsidies
across sectors that differ in their product market competitiveness and the
presence of a binding minimum wage. Moreover, no displacement effects
could be found suggesting that other types of labor inputs are complements
rather than substitutes in production.
IV.B. Robustness checks
The higher average employment sizes for subsidy receivers compared
to non-subsidized firms reflected in Table 5 suggests Maribel receivers and
non-receivers could also differ in other dimensions omitted from equations (2)
and (3) that are also correlated with program participation. One way to look at
this is to compare employment changes between receivers and non-receivers
given equal initial full-time manual employment for each year of the program.
To this end, columns (1), (4) and (7) of Table 10 use the following estimating
equation for each t=1997, 1998 or 1999:
(4) 0 1 2 1 log( ) log( ) it it it it y maribel y         
with it y full-time manual employment for firm i at time t, it maribel a dummy
equal to 1 if firm i received a subsidy at time t and 1 it y full-time manual
employment for firm i at time t-1 and it a white-noise error term. OLS point18
estimates for 1  are 7.1 percent for 1997, 6.5 percent for 1998 and 5.3 percent
for 1999. These point estimates are in line with those reported in column (2) of
Table 7 and, if anything, are somewhat larger due to lower percentage
employment growth for larger firms in general. To test the robustness of this
matching estimate, columns (2), (5) and (8) add a dummy for whether or not a
firm was also participating in other employment programs while receiving
Maribel subsidies. Interestingly, the coefficient on participation in other
employment programs is positive, statistically significant and particularly large
in 1998. Though the coefficient on the incidence of Maribel subsidies seems
positively correlated with participation in other employment programs, point
estimates remain positive and statistically significant ranging from 5.5 percent
in 1997, 5.2 percent in 1998 to 2.6 percent in 1998. Finally, columns (3), (6)
and (9) also add 2-digit industry dummies to equation (4) in order to compare
the employment changes between firms in the same industry without any
significant impact on the estimated difference-in-differences for Maribel
participation.
Table 11 repeats the analysis in Table 10 using the logarithm of the
mean pre-tax wage in each firm as the dependent variable in (4). Point
estimates are larger compared to those reported in the second column of Table
8 suggesting that high-wage firms have lower percentage wage growth in19
general.
6 For the full specification, point estimates are between 1.7 percent in
1999, 4.7 percent in 1997 to 5.2 percent in 1998. All in all, point estimates
presented in Tables 10 and 11 are in line with the hypothesis that Maribel
subsidies have increase full-time manual employment and wages and the
estimates suggest that, if anything, the fixed-effects estimates presented in
Tables 7 and 8 are biased downwards.
So far the analysis has only used information about whether or not a
firm received Maribel subsidies. However, we also observe the total subsidy
each participating firm received each year throughout the duration of the
Maribel program. Given the variation in per-worker subsidies documented in
Tables 2 and 3, consider the following estimating equation:
(5) 1998 0 1 1998 2 1997 1998 log( ) log( ) log( ) i i i i y subsidy y        
with 1998 i y ( 1997 i y ) full-time manual employment or the mean pre-tax wage for
firm i in 1998 (1997) and 1998 i subsidy the average per-worker subsidy firm i
received in 1998. The problem with estimating (5) using OLS, however, is that
the error term could not be independently and identically distributed. For
example, measurement error in total subsidies will bias OLS estimates
of 1 downwards.
To this end, Table 12 applies a 2SLS estimator using as first-stage
predictions for Maribel subsidies the variation in program intensity
6 This is also true in our data. A regression of mean pre-tax wage growth onto the logarithm of
beginning-of-period mean pre-tax wages gives a point estimate of -0.271 with a standard error
of 0.002.20
documented in Table 3 together with full-time manual and total employment
as well as the fraction of full-time manual workers employed at each
participating firm in 1997. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 12 report Maribel IV
elasticities of full-time manual employment and mean pre-tax wages
respectively. Both elasticities are positive and statistically significant suggesting
that a doubling of per-worker subsidies increases full-time manual employment
with 3.7 percent and pre-tax wages with 1.3 percent on average. Finally, in
columns (2) and (4) of Table 12, the first-stage controls are added linearly to
equation (5) and Maribel coefficients are identified through the discontinuities
in program generosity documented in Table 3. Adding the first-stage controls
to equation (5) does not change elasticity estimates which are given by 3.3
percent for full-time manual employment and 1.5 percent for pre-tax wages.
To see that the Maribel elasticities estimated in Table 12 are roughly in
line with the point estimates presented in Tables 7 and 8, first assume the
government would double its total Maribel payments by starting to subsidize
an equally large number of non-receivers in 1998. Difference-in-differences
estimates in Tables 7 and 8 would then suggest an increase in full-time manual
employment with 5.4 percent and an increase in pre-tax wages with 2.8 percent
of newly subsidized firms. Alternatively, suppose the government would
double the per-worker subsidy paid to all firms already receiving Maribel IV
subsidies thereby also doubling total Maribel expenditures. Point estimates in
Table 12 would then suggest an increase in full-time manual employment with21
3.7 percent and an increase in pre-tax wages with 1.3 percent of all
participating firms.
IV.C. The incidence of Maribel subsidies by industry
A final robustness test is given by point estimates in Table 13. Given
that even within industries some firms received subsidies and others did not,
Table 13 provides difference-in-differences estimates for each of eight
industries using the following estimating equation:
(6)
0 1 2 log( ) * ' ijt j ijt j t i it j y maribel industry YEAR           
with it y full-time manual or the average pre-tax wage in firm i, industry j at
time t. The first column of Table 13 shows that the increase in full-time manual
employment was highest for manufacturing firms (8.6 percent) and firms in
transport and communication (9.2 percent). The higher point estimates for
manufacturing firms as well as firms in transport and communication can be
explained by the higher average per-person subsidies in those industries
targeted by the Maribel II/III regime. But the higher point estimates could also
be explained by the more elastic factor demands due to more competitive
output markets for exporting manufacturing and transport and communication
industries. One way of testing for this hypothesis more formally is to regress
the logarithm of full-time manual employment on a dummy for Maribel
subsidies as well as its interaction with a measure of import penetration for a22
number of sub-industries in manufacturing. Doing this gives a point estimate
of 3.7 percent for the coefficient on the Maribel dummy and 7.1 percent for
the coefficient on its interaction with a measure of import penetration. The
difference-in-differences estimates for average pre-tax wages are reported in
column (2) of Table 13. All point estimates are positive but not all are
statistically significant and none are statistically significantly different from the
other (excluding mining and quarrying). Given the relatively high point
estimates for full-time manual employment in manufacturing and transport and
communications, this suggests that labor supply is relatively more elastic in
those industries, a fact that could partially be explained by more low-wage jobs
in these sectors and therefore a more binding minimum wage. But we leave it
to future exploration to test this hypothesis more formally.
V. Conclusions
This paper made use of a natural experiment to analyze the effects of
payroll tax exemptions targeted at manual workers in the late 1990s in Belgium,
g e n e r a l l y   k n o w n   a s   t h e   “ Ma r i b e l   s u b s i d i e s ” .   G i v e n   a   u n i q u e   panel of firm level
data with information about whether or not a firm received subsidy and, if so,
the amount of subsidy received in any given year, this paper has shown that
employment subsidies have increased full-time manual employment with 5 to 8
percent and pre-tax wages with 1 to 3 percent without much evidence for
“ displacement”effects for other workers. Moreover, we have argued that23
employment subsidies have increased employment but not wages by more in
low-wage exporting industries. This is line with a textbook description of labor
markets where it is predicted that the incidence of employment subsidies on
employment and wages is larger the more elastic is product and therefore labor
demand and where the employment effect is larger and the wage effect is
smaller the more elastic is labor supply because of a binding minimum wage.
Hopefully these insights will provide some guidance towards policies aimed at
improving the employment and income prospects of those workers in
developed nations most hurt by the current changes in relative factor demand.24
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Table 1: History of Maribel
Period Type of subsidy Total subsidy is based on


















04/1999-01/2004 proportional subsidy for
all employees
wage, number of manual
and non-manual workers
Table 2: Maribel II/III
Manual workers




Target industries 37 200 33 748 0
Other industries (not
excluded)
12 000 7 500 0
Excluded industries 0 0 0
Notes: Amounts are in thousand Belgian Francs (BEF), one Euro=10.33 BEF.
Table 3: Maribel IV
Manual workers




X<0.66 34 000+20 000*X 20 000+20 000*X 0
X>=0.66 34 000+20 000*0.66 20 000+20 000*0.66 0
Excluded industries 0 0 0
Notes: Amounts are in thousand Belgian Francs (BEF), one Euro=10.33 BEF. X measures the fraction of
non-manual workers.26
Table 4: Comparing Belfirst with administrative data
Number of Maribel workers Maribel subsidy
Belfirst (1996) RSZ (1995) Belfirst (1996) RSZ (1995)
Mining and quarrying 0.62 0.34 0.67 0.49
Manufacturing 51.94 50.62 73.59 74.44
Electricity, gas and water 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Construction 17.49 15.91 7.22 6.50
Wholesale and retail trade 12.95 10.96 7.40 4.88
Hotels and restaurants 2.92 3.85 1.04 1.62
Transport and comm.. 7.17 6.85 7.19 7.96
Financial intermediation 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
Business services 5.48 6.48 2.28 2.24
Public administration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health and social work 0.05 3.14 0.02 1.07
Public services 1.27 1.80 0.49 0.74
Private households 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Total 430 101 788 908 8 688 18 053
Notes: Maribel subsidies are in million BEF.
Table 5: Subsidized and non-subsidized firms in Belfirst



















1996 20 635 18.7 799.85 13 003 4.78 792.83
1997 27 644 19.04 804.90 9 869 4.90 754.29
1998 32 517 15.46 822.37 9695 5.28 760.91
1999 22 827 20.66 852.65 23 852 4.12 809.99
Notes: Numbers reported in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) are means.
Table 6: Firm level Maribel subsidies in Belfirst

















Notes: Reported numbers are means and standard are in brackets.27
Table 7: Difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of Maribel subsidies on log(full-time
manual employment) using all years
All participants Start participating Stop participating


























corr( FE, regressors) 0.348 0.333 0.330 0.320 0.405 0.390
Number of observations 104 250 104 250 90 262 90 262 93 764 93 764
Number of firms 44 967 44 967 43 089 43 089 44 030 44 030
Notes: Data are taken from Belfirst. All estimates are fixed effects estimates controlling for firm fixed
effects and year dummies. Reported standard errors are robust standard errors.
Table 8: Difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of Maribel subsidies on log(pre-tax
wage) using all years
All participants Start participating Stop participating


























corr( FE, regressors) 0.044 0.045 0.072 0.085 0.033 0.032
Number of observations 103 343 103 343 89 480 89 480 92 909 92 909
Number of firms 44 598 44 598 42 725 42 725 43 631 43 631
Notes: Data are taken from Belfirst. All estimates are fixed effects estimates controlling for firm fixed
effects and year dummies. Reported standard errors are robust standard errors.
Table 9: Difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of Maribel subsidies on other


















































corr( FE, regressors) 0.045 0.048 0.042 0.050 -0.025 -0.011 0.019 0.020
Number of observations 6 767 6 767 52 931 52 931 51 477 51 477 7 478 7 478
Number of firms 3 142 3 142 23 188 23 188 24 395 24 395 3620 3620
Notes: Data are taken from Belfirst. All estimates are fixed effects estimates controlling for firm fixed
effects and year dummies. Reported standard errors are robust standard errors.28
Table 10: OLS estimates of the impact of Maribel subsidies on log(full-time manual employment)
by year
1997 1998 1999

























































no no yes no no yes no no yes
R-squared 0.884 0.884 0.885 0.876 0.876 0.878 0.917 0.917 0.917
Numb of obs 27 839 27 839 27 839 33 397 33 397 33 397 38 327 38 327 38 327
Notes: Data are taken from Belfirst. Reported standard errors are robust standard errors.
Table 11: OLS estimates of the impact of Maribel subsidies on log(pre-tax wage) by year
1997 1998 1999

























































no no yes no no yes no no yes
R-squared 0.550 0.550 0.567 0.579 0.579 0.592 0.579 0.597 0.588
Numb of obs 27 164 27 164 27 164 32 586 32 568 32 586 37 320 37 320 38 320
Notes: Data are taken from Belfirst. Reported standard errors are robust standard errors.
Table 12: 2SLS estimates of Maribel IV elasticities
Log(FT manual employment) Log(pre-tax wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
















First-stage controls no yes no yes
Number of observations 27 516 27 516 27 225 27 225
First-stage R-squared 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.645
Notes: Data are taken from Belfirst. First-stage predictions are derived from Table 3. First-stage controls
added linearly to the second stage in columns (2) and (4) are initial FT manual employment, initial FT
employment, the fraction of manual workers and dummies for 2-digit industries. Reported standard errors
are robust standard errors.29
Table 13: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of Maribel subsidies by










Received Maribel x dummy for
































Number of observations 103 151 102 245
Number of firms 44 479 44 110
Notes: Data are taken from Belfirst. All estimates are fixed effects estimates controlling for firm fixed
effects and year dummies. The industries used in the analyses are taken from Table 4 given a sufficiently
large fraction of Maribel employment. Reported standard erros are robust standard errors.30
Figure 1: A canonical framework to analyze the impact of Maribel subsidies on employment and
wages for different assumptions about the labor market
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Notes: Data are taken from OECD Statistics 2004.
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